Culture: A Pretext Against Nation Building Efforts

The existence of radical Islamist terrorism has always been linked with cultural manifestations originating from the Middle Eastern religious grievances against the West. However, the truth of the matter is that cultural factor alone should neither be accountable for the impediments in Westernization, liberalization and democratization nor should it be an excuse to relieve necessary commitments toward nation building efforts.

I. The Case Against Clash of Civilizations

The September 2001 World Trade Center attacks lend prominence to Samuel P. Huntington’s predictions that cultural or religious identity will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. It further reinforced the increasingly regarded prescience of Huntington’s theory following the United States invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. When blasphemous cartoon depicting Prophet Muhammad outraged Muslims around the world, and Iran’s ongoing tensions with the West on the issue of nuclear proliferation continued, Huntington’s theory was thought to have scored the home run. Yet, in retrospect of cultural changes and advancement toward market liberalization in Europe, the Clash of Civilizations did not quite master all the sophistication it was hyped to have acquired.

Needless to say, Huntington’s charge that Westernization, liberalization and democratization are not useful to nation building efforts is a fallacy since there has been occurrences of states that have moved on to embrace these models toward political and economic prosperity. In the case of successful democracies, nations such as India and Japan are evident that democratic and Western values have been easily transmitted and altered in contrary to what Huntington proposes. Moreover, the West itself has been successful in the establishment of absolute rule throughout most of its history.

More currently, the enlargements of the European Union (EU) integrated Europe’s eastern border with the rest of the region which Huntington had classified into two civilizations – the Western and the Orthodox.

Most of Europe’s historically Protestant and Roman Catholic countries (with the exception of Switzerland and Norway) have integrated to become European Union (EU) members, while a number of Europe’s historically Orthodox countries such as Greece and newly accepted Cyprus have also done the same. In addition, the membership of countries within the EU as well as their commitments within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also provide evidence that Huntington’s classification of separate civilizations is quite problematic to begin with. (europa.eu, 2006)

First published in an article titled The Clash of Civilizations in the academic journal Foreign Affairs in 1993, Samuel P. Huntington’s thesis strongly discourages Westernization, liberalization and democratization efforts in nation-building projects. The Clash of Civilizations purports that people’s cultural or religious identity will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world to the contrary of what other theorists and writers believed. (Huntington, 1993)

Francis Fukuyama for example argues that liberal democracy and Western values had become the only remaining ideological alternative for nations in the post-Cold War world; contradicting Huntington’s belief that the age of ideology had ended. Specifically, Fukuyama argued that the world had reached the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1992) whereas Huntington believed that the world had returned to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. Huntington supports this cultural conflict argument with the concept of different civilizations; which he says represents cultural identity, and is useful in the analysis for potential cultural conflict.

Huntington writes, “It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations.” (Huntington, 1993)

Despite an elaborate categorization, Huntington’s identified civilizations are disjointed. For example, Huntington’s classification of the Muslim world is made up of groups of fractured ethnic Kurds, Arabs, Persians, Turks, Pakistanis, and Indonesians (Huntington, 1993); while being mostly Islamic in general, these civilizations are all largely different in cultural and world views.

Moreover, Huntington’s criteria of his proposed sketch of civilized ethnic makeup are not clear. Cultural differences between China and Japan are not any more easily distinguishable than that between China and Vietnam. Yet, Huntington classified Vietnam and China under the label of the Sinic civilization (Huntington, 1993) while Japan is left by itself to form a separate civilization. In addition, Huntington’s distinction between the Western and Orthodox civilizations do not take into account other non-religious factors, such as its post-Communist legacy or the level of economic development and he also ignores the internal differences within sub-divisive Muslim communities.

Huntington’s definition for his categorization of civilizations and the number of civilizations also lacks clarity. Generally civilizations consist of states and social groups; including ethnic and religious minorities, yet predominant religion seems to be the main criterion for Huntington’s classification as in the case of categorizing most of the Middle Eastern states under an unbrella of Islamic states, and in some instances Huntington also includes geographical proximity and linguistic similarity as well. For instance, Huntington categorizes the Sinic civilization as that of China, Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, and Taiwan; countries with a presence of the Chinese diaspora as well as linguistically Chinese and Mandarin speaking populations, yet Japan, which is considered to possess a hybrid of Chinese civilization is nonetheless isolated from this category. Perhaps because Japan may have had adopted much modern Western technology, a political system of parliamentary democracy, and free enterprise, despite remaining culturally distinct from the West.

Huntington supports his findings with the conclusion that because of these ‘distinct’ civilizational traits the trends of global conflict after the end of the Cold War are increasingly appearing at civilizational divisions. He attributes wars following the break up of Yugoslavia, in Chechnya, and that between India and Pakistan as evidence of intercivilizational conflict. For Huntington, the War on Terror as a whole is the perfect materialization of his theory.

What Huntington failed to observe in his treatment of culture is the fact that intercivilizational conflict is truly an extremely complex term that extends beyond definition and categorization. It is true that by looking at general geographical proximity and superficially categorizing cultural distinctions can lead one to the assumption that conflicts within these areas are intercivilizational. However, there is more than just intercivilizational to this issue. For instance, while Huntington did lay a foundation for his categorization on religion, he failed to take into account the religious differences between civilizational groups within a proximity. In addition, many other factors and not just culture alone are accountable to the nature of current intercivilizational conflict; they include, economics and geopolitical factors aside from cultural issues.

Furthermore, Huntington has argued that the widespread of Western belief in the universality of the West’s values and political systems is naive and that continued insistence on democratization and universal norms will only further antagonize other civilizations. (Huntington, 1993) With this observation, Huntington fails to realize that Western belief and values if they were to be incorporated into other cultures should not be permitted to apply wholly but rather, only applicable when taking into consideration the current distinctive custom or cultures of the civilization in question. This application if made will be useful for finding the favorable conditions in nation-building efforts.

At the same time, Huntington dismisses the West’s reluctance to accept the fact that universality in Westernization, liberalization and democratization will antagonize other cultures to the argument that the West built the international system and wrote its laws to begin with. (Huntington, 1993) This however is an unfortunate and a very short-sighted observation as it digresses from the actual discussion of the effects of Westernization, liberalization and democratization on failing foreign states. By doing so Huntington insinuates that the West has no understanding of the ramifications of political invasions. It is understandable that no group would like to be invaded and subjected to Westernization thus to assume that the West is not aware of such fact is all too simplistic an observation to make in the very first place.

Among others, Huntington is also overly suspicious of the Sinic civilization as culturally asserting itself and its values relative to the West due to its rapid economic growth. (Huntington, 1993) Specifically, Huntington is overzealously suspicious of China’s goals in attempting to reassert itself as the regional hegemon, and that other countries in the region will join China due to the history of hierarchical command structures implicit in the Confucian Sinic civilization, as opposed to the individualism and pluralism valued in the West.

Huntington feared that regional Asian powers such as the two Koreas, Vietnam, and Cambodia will acquiesce to Chinese demands and become more supportive of China rather than attempting to oppose it. As such Huntington proposes that the rise of China poses as one of the most significant problems and the most powerful long-term threat to the West; as Chinese cultural assertion is said to clash with the American desire for the lack of a regional hegemon in East Asia.

With concerns on culture and civilization as a whole, Huntington immediately sees the embrace of Islamic civilization as a strength and potential ally to China, especially since both civilizations share common conflicts with the West. Specifically, Huntington identifies common Chinese and Islamic interests in the areas of weapons proliferation, human rights, and democracy that conflict with those of the West, and feels that these are areas in which the two civilizations will cooperate. Huntington further argues that a Sino-Islamic relationship will emerge in which China will cooperate more closely with anti-American states like Iran and Pakistan, and other states to augment its international position.

Huntington’s aforementioned suspect for a Sino-Islamic pit against the West is paranoia at its best. While China has its own perception of the West in relation to its own cultural standing, China’s ambitions has to do more with its desire for economic growth and achievement within the area of technology and production rather than a desire for destructive power and geopolitical interests that intentionally confront global relationships with cultural values.

The worst case scenario of Huntington’s argument for civilizational conflict is one that is being most prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims. The current ongoing war on terror as Huntington puts it is attributable to the ancient history of conflict between two civilizations as being the greatest impediment toward nation building. Specifically Huntington attributes to the conflict between the Muslims and the West as one pertaining to the competing of interests between the religion of Christianity and Islam. (Huntington, 1993) Again, the argument regarding the relationship between Islam and the West is quite abrupt and without much consideration for other underlying factors. To attribute ancient hatreds as the sole source of conflict would be an irresponsible conclusion to make as one would immediately dismiss the real solutions to handle other true underlying factors affecting tensions between the Muslims and the West. Among other matters, Huntington has immediately failed to address internally and externally attributable factors that have very much to do with the lack of political and ecnomic resources that are directly impeding Western nation-building efforts in Muslim nations.

II. Culture/ Religion is not the only attributable factor

While Huntington attempted to draw a superficially elaborate case for a Western-Islamic conflict through a simplistic and biased notion of culture in the Clash of Modern Civilizations, the failure of culture would be more plausible when explained by the phenomenon of modernization in a variety of dimensions; that is through economic, social, cultural, and political lenses; instead of focusing solely on the realm of culture.

Shireen T. Hunter in her article Modernization and Democratization in the Muslim World cites Max Weber as having provided the clearest connection in explaining for the interrelation among culture, religion, and modernization in the capitalist system. (Hunter, 2004) According to Weber, Islam is incompatible with modernization because “the role played by wealth accruing from the spoils of war and from political aggrandizement in Islam is diametrically opposed to the role played by wealth in the Puritan religion.” (Hunter, 2004)

While Weber’s dismissal of religion as incapable of developing a capitalist system, and incapable of modernization was later proven by Sinic nations as unjustified, Weber, (unlike Huntington who concentrated only on culture alone) does so by examining the economic transformation of religious zones that have showed that other religious traditions are indeed capable of mastering rational thinking and action in various fields, including economics.

Hunter also attempts to discover the relationship between Islam and modernity by closely examining the concept of “modernity” and “modernism”. Unlike Huntington’s dismissal of culture as a factor for causing conflicts within civilizations, religion according to Hunter is seen as impacting a larger role in the context of modernity and the transformation of Europe. (Hunter, 2004) Religion played a role in helping transform the foundation of political legitimacy to other nonreligious sources, and consequently leading to democracy. In addition, Weber disproves Huntington’s theory by pointing out that there have been instances of Muslim leaders and intellectuals embracing rationalism and modernity as fully compatible with Islam instead of the rejection of rationalism. Thus, culture alone cannot be accountable for thwarting nation-building efforts aimed at democratization, liberalization and Westernization.

This also brings us back to the issue of democracy in the context of Islam. Is democracy viable in Islam? Or will culture and religion dominate the scene to disprove any correlation and reinforce Huntington’s fact that religion and culture are indeed the causes for further conflict? Here, Hunter has introduced the importance of a historical approach when examining the dynamics of Islam and democracy. According to Hunter, concepts such as Islam and democracy – should not be divorced from their historical context. (Hunter, 2004)

Culture and religion are also very complex and broad terms. The definition of Islam and democracy are important and significant in assessing whether culture, religion and democracy can mix together, yet neither democracy nor Islam can be easily defined in simple and direct forms. This means that the complexity of the matter in comprehending culture is beyond the simple disregard for the impact of culture as Huntington had conclusively and simplistically defined the root cause of all evil in bringing about conflict.

While Huntington had purportedly charge that Islam as a religion affects the tendency of clashes and conflicts among civilizations in the Middle Eastern region, Islam as understood by Hunter, can also provide a wide spectrum of principles and symbols that can be used to distinguish between an authoritarian a democratic platform. Huntington’s rejection of religion and culture as a source for conflict again is too simplistic and incompatible to accept as Hunter has pointed out that Islam is indeed interpreted differently by Muslims. Huntington’s definition and conclusion of Islam’s role in democratization is not final and is difficult to conclude as radical Islamists view Islam as incompatible with democracy, while other Muslims see no incompatibility, and some others believe that democracy is indeed essential for a true Islamic society. (Hunter, 2004)

Huntington has asserted that Westernization, liberalization and democratization are not feasible in the context of the Clash of Civilizations. However the uncertainties in levels of modernization and democratization in the Muslim world has again raised the question of whether the process of modernization as carried out in the Muslim world has not impeded the establishment and consolidation of democracy. Opposed to what Huntington believed, Hunter noted that the Muslim experience can be best understood by recognizing the underlying tension within the complexity of modernity between authoritarian centralization, liberalization and equality. (Hunter, 2004) If this is indeed possible, then Huntington’s assumptions that culture and religion are straightforward conclusive issues to determining their impact on the outcome of conflict and clashes within civilizations cannot be accepted after all.

The other factor to take into consideration would be the fact whether postindependence Muslim modernization was carried on the foundation of colonial era authoritarian modernization, and if that was really the case, the whole process would have the tendency to limit rather than expand the level of popular political participation. If the colonial era authoritarian modernization had not impacted the development of democracy, then modernization would have been successful. (Hunter, 2004)

Concerning culture and its impact on development, it is logical that cultural structures, values, and attitudes exert a degree of influence over the process of development. Thus unlike Huntington’s assertion that culture brings nothing to the table except for determining conflict would be too easy to come to a conclusion to. To add to the importance and contribution of culture, other similar cultural attitudes, such as those regarding patterns of savings, productive and distributive aspects of the economy, also influence the process and nature of development. Thus, in effect, any nation-building efforts through Westernization, liberalization and democratization would result in some sort of productive effect or change since there is a presence of interaction between cultural attitudes toward the process and the nature of development in nation building efforts

On the issue of democratization, economic development also plays a part to contribute to a more favorable environment when it concerns the transition to democracy. Huntington never did touch upon the economic impact citing culture and religion as the only most important factors. Hunter noted that models of economic development help the emergence of new economic and social groups, by challenging the authoritarian privileges of the state, thus creating a more favorable and positive environment for transition to democracy (Hunter, 2004). The emergence of pressure from economic development changes the balance of power between government and society, thus causing a new political status. While economic development can bring about some kind of change, the repressive nature of the Muslim world, would not allow the nature of economic development to a shift in the balance of power between state and society.

As such, culture should not be the sole pretext against nation-building as cultural factors are not the only impediments affecting liberalization, Westernization and democratization natin-building efforts. It is true that internal factors concerning the economic and political nature of Muslim countries are indeed significant obstacles to their liberalization, Westernization and democratization processes. Some of these characteristics as pointed out by Hunter, have historical roots, including the ramifications of colonialism and anticolonial struggles. These include ethnically divided societies, weak national identities, and large and powerful militaries, whose influence permeates all spheres of life. Others are the result of these countries’ economic history pertaining to size, resource structure, and the nature of their economic systems. (Hunter, 2004)

Other factors that affect the outcome of Westernization, liberalization and democratization would be the nature of the economic system of the Muslim country in question. Hunter noted that a principal characteristic of the vast majority of the Muslim countries’ economic systems is the excessive role of the state and the weakness of the private sector. (Hunter, 2004) This dominance exercised by the state in the economic life of society is evident of a the imbalance of power in the state’s favor and against society. The energy-rich Middle Eastern and North African Muslim states are the prime examples of what Hunter termed ‘rentier’ economies. In addition, other forms of rent deriving from illegal sources such as drug trafficking, have also been important to note. Such is the character of strong states yet weak societies and will very much impact nation-building efforts toward Western democratization and liberalization.

One other factor that Huntington failed to touch upon is the fact that there is an excessive power of the military in a majority of Muslim countries. The presence of large military establishments with extensive influence in all aspects of national life can exert a tremendous influence on the political and economic life of the country. Political influence is exerted either directly where a military or ex military leader is the direct head of state (as in the case of Pakistan and Egypt) or indirectly, where the military leader advises the head of state behind the scenes.

Among other issues of social and economic factors that Huntington had also overlooked is the existence of the character of failing states, which include large-scale poverty, illiteracy, poor health conditions, and large income inequalities. These factors impede nation-building, and more importantly, the democratization efforts aimed at the Muslim world. This aspect of failed or failing state factor can be used by governments simply as an excuse to avoid any liberalization or Westernization of political systems and to exclude even moderate and liberal Muslims from participating in the political process.

Gender inequality is also an important factor that cannot be ignored. This is because most Muslim countries are still characterized by a large gender gap in economic, social and political areas. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the idea of a woman going out to work is a taboo not to be practiced in tradtiona; social or acultural settings This gender gap is a serious impediment to development because it contributes to high rates of population growth as well as high unproductivity. Ronald Inglhart and Pippa Norris in their article The True Clash of Civilizations. (conflict between democracy and Islam) writes about the cultural fault line that they believe divides the Muslim world is now beyond democracy and more about sex. Huntington had unfortunately not addressed the ramification of such social factors..

While internal factors have so far been discussed as very important to affecting the outcome of democratization efforts, external factors at the international political and economic systems and the policies and actions of the great powers have also played a largely impeding role in the process of Westernization, liberalization and democratization of the Muslim world.

If any, Muslim countries cannot and should not continue to blame colonialism for the failures in Western nation-buidling efforts. Hunter cites the fact that the British rule in Malaysia helped its postindependence liberalization within a by-and-large democratic order. In other areas, the Dutch rule in Indonesia, did not help postindependence modernization within a democratic order, and as a result undermined Indonesia’s cohesion. (Hunter, 2004)

With regard to external factors intrinsic to the impediment of nation-building would be The Impact of the Cold War and the impact on great power interests in the Muslim world. The manipulation of Islam by the West as well as by Muslim countries, for the advancement of their political goals, will not always, conform to the strategic and economic interests of the great political powers.

Huntington also neglected the impact of resources such as oil and democracy in contributing to a huge role in obstructing nation-building efforts. What Huntington failed to recognize is the eminence of the world’s largest reserves of oil and a large amounts of natural gas reserves in Muslim countries, especially those of the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, and the overwhelming dependence of the major industrial Western powers on these reserves have indeed impeded democratization efforts in the Muslim world. The presence of these large energy reserves in close proximity to the Soviet Union, brings about the competing interests in oil as well as security concerns among key players, thus exacting more concern on stability and the maintenance of the status quo rather than cncentrating on sociopolitical change in the context of nation-building efforts.

III. The Case for Democratization in Nation-Building.

While Huntington had argued for a case against Westernization, liberalization and democratization when it comes to commiting nation-building efforts toward populations that are by his definition naturally swayed by tensions as a product of cultural pressures and grievances, nation-building really cannot happen without democratization efforts

In Marina Ottaway’s article Nation Building (Think Again), she refutes what Huntington believes we should omit from our reconstruction model and that is democratic efforts. (Ottaway, 2002)

While it may be unfortunate that there exists a one-size-fits-all model for democratic reconstruction, it is however politically necessary to equate state reconstruction with building democracy, where a negotiated settlement to the conflict and the meeting of major domestic groups to reach an agreement on the structure of the political system are followed by elections. In addition the demobilization of former combatants engaging in hostilities and the development of a new national army, to reforming the judiciary, and the restructuring of the state’s financial and economic institution are necessary to run a modern state.

The truth of the matter is that this nation-building model is extremely expensive, requires huge commitments of money and personnel from the global community. Implemented only in the most serious cases of the world, the nation-building project in Bosnia for example is excruciatingly slow and there is no certainty if whether these efforts will reap the gains that the gloobal community is hoping for. On top of that, in other areas where these measures are being implemented, projects are underway but absent the presence of resources needed. In Afghanistan for example, a robust international peacekeeping force is still not met.

The crux of the matter is not to dismiss democratization as a moot or impossible issue. Instead of doing away with nation-building and putting culture into place as the scapegoat for scraping away nation-building the answer here should not be about constructing a pretext against nation-building efforts but rather in coming up with a solution to address the lack of resources for these undertakings.

The other issue is to set more objectives and goals that the global community want out of nation building and to remodel the one-size-fits-all model to fit into the unique situation of each country’s political, economic and cultural reality. As Ottaway has written, the international community will have to deal with the problem of warlords in one way or another and there is no other way of making a roundabout turn to resolve the problems in failed and failing states government. (Ottaway, 2002)

There is no worser way than to do nothing about the problem or as Huntington has decided that democratization should be abandoned because of culture. Putting culture forward as a pretext for crunching up an Islamic civilization and a Western civilization and the evidence for a civilizational clash is not convincing especially when distinct cultural boundaries do not exist. Conflict only arises out of philosophical beliefs between groups, regardless of cultural or religious identity. What Huntington did by categorizing the civilizations is to disregard the dynamic interdependency and cultural interaction among the global community and therefore is not applicable to any nation-building efforts.

Works Cited

1. Europa.eu, 2006. European Union Member States. European Union Online.

2. Huntington, Samuel P., 1993. The Clash of Civilizations. Council on Foreign Relations Inc. Foreign Affairs.

3. Fukuyama, Francis, 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. Penguin Publications.

4. Hunter T. Shireen, 2004. Modernization and Democratization in the Muslim World. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

5. Ottaway, Marina, 2002. Nation Building (Think Again). Foreign Policy.

6. Inglehart, Ronald; Norris, Pippa, 2003. The True Clash of Civilizations (Conflict Between Democracy and Islam). Foreign Policy.

7. Llosa, Maro Vargas, 2001. The Culture of Liberty (Liberating Influence of Globalization). Foreign Policy.

8. Week 7 Norwich University, 2006. Nation/ State Building: An Examination of Relevant Approaches and Theories.

9. Week 8 Norwich University, 2006. Application of Relevant Approaches to and Theories on Nation/ State Building to Iraq Case Study (2003-2005)

10. Week 9 Norwich University, 2006. Politico-Cultural Aspects of Economic and Financial Reconstruction: An Examination of Relevant Approaches and Theories.

11. Week 10 Norwich University, 2006. Application of Relevant Approaches to and Theories on the Politico-Cultural Aspects of Economic and Financial Reconstruction to Afghanistan Case Study (1979-2005